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This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article to be published by Taylor & Francis in the journal Annals of 
the American Association of Geographers, accepted on 29 October 2016. 
HYBRID SOVEREIGNTY AND THE STATE OF EXCEPTION IN THE PALESTINIAN 
REFUGEE CAMPS IN LEBANON 
 
Dr Adam Ramadan, University of Birmingham 




This article traces a genealogy of sovereignty and exception in the Palestinian refugee camps in 
Lebanon that highlights their mutual connections and contaminations with the mechanisms of 
Lebanese state sovereignty from 1948 onwards. Drawing together two theoretical approaches 
emerging from the work of Giorgio Agamben and recent political geographical work on 
sovereignty, we explore the refugee camps as spaces of exception characterized by hybrid 
sovereignties. Drawing on original fieldwork, we trace the evolution of the relationship of 
exception and its mutual links with the production of hybridity in Lebanon’s sovereignty from 
1948 until today, focusing particularly on the key period from 1968 to 1982 when Palestinian 
militancy led to a formal recognition of Palestinian autonomy in the camps. Rather than simply 
undermining Lebanon’s sovereignty, the camps’ fragmented security and territoriality have 
instead reshaped Lebanon’s state sovereignty in complex ways, and forged hybrid spaces for 










In this article, we trace a genealogy of sovereignty and exception in the Palestinian refugee 
camps in Lebanon. To understand the historical political geographies of these camps, we 
highlight their mutual connections with the workings of state sovereignty in Lebanon since 
1948. In doing so, we bring together two critical theoretical arguments to explore the camps as 
spaces of exception characterized by hybrid sovereignties. Drawing on the political philosophy 
of Giorgio Agamben, many recent accounts see refugee camps and asylum seeker detention 
centers as a spatial manifestation of the state of exception, spaces placed outside the law by 
the sovereign, within which refugees are stripped of political life. However, the sovereign state, 
with exclusive authority and a monopoly of legitimate violence within its borders, simply does 
not exist in Lebanon. A generalized model of the camp as a space of exception, where the law is 
suspended by a singular all-powerful sovereign, fails to make sense of the complex and hybrid 
forms of sovereignty in Lebanon. Established diplomatic approaches depict Lebanon as a ‘weak 
state’, whose sovereignty is compromised by nonstate actors and external interference by 
other states. Instead, as Fregonese (2012a, 2012b) has argued, Lebanon’s particular 
postcolonial governmentality has produced hybrid arrangements of sovereignty between the 
state and a range of non-state actors and armed groups. Widening this hybrid perspective on 
sovereignty to address the relationship between the state and the camp in Lebanon, this article 
argues that the Palestinian camps are exceptions that should be understood as part of 
Lebanon’s already multifarious landscape of fractured and hybrid sovereignties.  
Established academic and popular discourses have defined Palestinian refugee camps as 
exceptional spaces that undermine Lebanon’s sovereignty – as ‘extra-territorial’ entities (Agier 
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2011), ‘security islands’ (Suleiman 1999), a ‘state-within-a-state’ (Sayigh 1997, 21), ‘spaces of 
exception’ (Ramadan 2009b). Building on and complicating these approaches, we argue that 
the camps’ fragmented security and territoriality (re)arrangements through almost seventy 
years of existence have always contaminated and reshaped state sovereignty in complex ways. 
By tracing the interplay between camp governance and security structures and the Lebanese 
state since 1948, we complicate the binary between norm and exception, revealing a more 
complex realm of hybrid sovereignty arrangements of which the camps are part, and whose 
spatial histories require further investigation. Focusing on how the relation of exception has 
changed through time, we offer a genealogical reading of camp sovereignty in Lebanon as 
hybrid, where state and non-state actors at different times have competed or collaborated to 
control refugee camps and those dwelling within them. 
Sovereignty practices shaped by both state and non-state actors are by no means unique to 
Lebanon. Political geographical research has exposed the sovereign practices ‘at work beyond 
the state-centered bureaucratic, elitist, disembodied realms’ (Lunstrum 2013, 9) in diverse 
contexts, from government in exile (McConnell 2009) to the management of protest (Fregonese 
2013) and of post-conflict societies (Koopman 2011). By bringing together in a new way two 
sets of scholarly work – one on camps and the state of exception, and the other on hybrid 
sovereignty – through this substantial empirical case, we trace the ways in which the state of 
exception emerges, but also transforms and fragments over time, as part of broader 
sovereignty (re)arrangements encompassing state and non-state.  
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In the next section of the article, we consider critically Giorgio Agamben’s key conceptualization 
of the state of exception, in the context of the Palestinian camps in Lebanon. Building on critical 
political geographies of state sovereignty (Sidaway 2003; Agnew 2009; McConnell 2009, 2010), 
we place the camps within a broader landscape of hybrid sovereignties in Lebanon. This 
hybridity places Lebanon’s governance beyond the normative narrative of the ‘weak state’ that 
has long shaped Lebanon’s political economy. In the third section, we trace a genealogy of the 
changing arrangements of sovereignty in the camps, and their mutual influence with the wider 
sovereignty landscape of Lebanon. We focus on four key periods, from the years of increasingly 
repressive state intervention in the spatial regulation and security of the camps through the 
1950s and 1960s, the rise of the Palestinian political and militant movements and consequent 
loss of state authority in the camps in 1969, the years of the Palestinian ‘Revolution’ from 1970, 
and finally the years of Palestinian marginalization after 1982 and the end of the civil war in 
1990. Not simply spaces of bare life, or insecure zones eroding Lebanese sovereignty, the 
Palestinian camps of Lebanon are hybrid spaces of political possibility, defined by a series of 
‘cross-contamination[s] of different state and nonstate actors’ (Fregonese 2012b, 658), within 
which particular kinds of refugee political agency have emerged, disappeared and transformed 
over time. 
As we have argued elsewhere, arguments about refugee camps as spaces of exception must 
emerge from thoroughly empirical and grounded engagements with such spaces (Ramadan 
2013). This article draws on nine periods of fieldwork in Beirut, Sidon, and the Palestinian 
camps of Beddawi, Burj Barajneh, Burj Shemali, El Buss, Mar Elias, Nahr el-Bared, Rashidieh and 
Shatila, conducted between 2002 and 2010. Around 200 interviews conducted with refugee 
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camp residents, civil and political representatives of Palestinian organizations, Lebanese 
politicians, former militia fighters, activists, humanitarian workers and journalists, covered the 
broad situation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, the relationships between camps and 
Lebanon, and the regulation of sovereignty and territorial control. 
Sovereignty and exception in Lebanon 
The work of Giorgio Agamben (1998, 2005) on sovereign power, bare life and the state of 
exception has been hugely influential for recent work on refugees and camps. At the heart of 
Agamben’s political philosophy lie the camp, as a spatial manifestation of the state of 
exception, and the figure of homo sacer, a body stripped of political life. Drawing on the work 
of Carl Schmitt, for whom sovereignty is defined by the ability to step outside and suspend the 
law in a state of exception, Agamben argues that ‘the inclusion of bare life in the political 
realm ... constitutes the original – if concealed – nucleus of sovereign power’ (1998: 6). 
The space of the camp, specifically the concentration camp, represents the culmination of the 
logic of modern politics, for Agamben. This camp is the absolute space of the exception, where 
the ‘temporary suspension of the rule of law on the basis of a factual state of danger, is now 
given a permanent spatial arrangement’ (Agamben 1998, 168-9). It is a space taken outside the 
legal order that is nevertheless integral to the political order of modernity: nothing less than 
‘the hidden matrix of the political space in which we live’ (Agamben 2000, x). Those interned by 
the sovereign in the camp are stripped of their rights and political existence, excluded from the 
protections of the law, and reduced to ‘bare life’ (see also Minca 2006; Giaccaria and Minca 
2011). There is a ‘perfectly real filiation’, for Agamben (2000, 21), between refugee camps, 
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internment camps, concentration camps and extermination camps: spaces in which the normal 
order is suspended, and those interred within are reduced to bare life by the biopolitical 
interventions of sovereign power. So too do totalitarian and democratic regimes exist on a 
continuum: the figure of the refugee demonstrates that the supposedly inalienable ‘rights of 
man’ are applicable only inasmuch as man appears as a citizen, and the sovereign can at any 
moment cast out any person from the political order (Agamben 1998, 126–135, following 
Arendt 1943, 1979, 299). 
Nevertheless, in possessing only bare life and being cast out of political life, the refugee 
represents a ‘disquieting element’ to the international order of states, nations and citizens. 
There cannot be an autonomous space within this order for a pure human non-citizen 
(Agamben 2000, 19), so refugees are included in that order through a separate international 
regime of humanitarianism: ‘a space of exception set apart from the common world but still 
under control’ (Agier 2011, 147). Humanitarian organizations ‘can only grasp human life in the 
figure of bare or sacred life, and therefore, despite themselves, maintain a secret solidarity with 
the very powers they ought to fight’ (Agamben 1998, 133-4). 
This language of camps and bare life has proven appealing to scholars seeking to understand 
the often violent and precarious lives of refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants 
(Edkins 2000; Edkins and Pin-Fat 2005; Turner 2005; Papastergiadis 2006). However, a 
sustained critique has emerged of Agamben’s work, and particularly about the ways some have 
put those ideas to use (Owens 2009). An analysis of refugees as silenced and disempowered 
homines sacri, while potentially powerful, cannot offer an effective theoretical understanding 
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of political agency on the part of refugees themselves. Furthermore the space of exception as a 
universal model of camps risks missing out more complex sovereignty arrangements in refugee 
camps (Ramadan 2013). If camps are spaces of exception, that suspension of the law can be as 
much through the ‘absence or weakness’ of sovereign state power, as its intensification (Elden 
2009, 61). 
In this article we offer a reading of camp sovereignty in Lebanon as hybrid, where state and 
non-state actors at different times competed or collaborated to control refugee camps and 
those dwelling within them. In Lebanon, non-state actors are de-facto practitioners of 
territoriality and sovereignty, and further hybrid political formations exist between the state 
and the non-state: ‘they are not the state but resemble it, collaborate with it, or overpower it’ 
(Fregonese 2012b, 661). We offer a grounded, empirically informed account of the changing 
sovereign arrangements over Palestinian refugee camps since their establishment from 1948, a 
genealogy of the exception through which we can make historical sense of the lack of control 
over camps today. With a theoretical openness to seeing state sovereignty as something less 
than absolute, we consider the Palestinian camps as part of a broader terrain of fractured and 
‘hybrid’ sovereignties that place Lebanon’s governance beyond the normative narrative of the 
‘weak state’ (Fregonese 2012b). 
Lebanon: from weakness to hybridity  
The notion of the ‘weak’ state has developed within literature in comparative politics, 
development economics, and International Relations (Kaplan 2008) and, since the ‘war on 
terror’, within security discourse and conflict studies (Carment, Prest, and Samy 2010, 9). 
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Lebanon fits the normative definition of a weak state: one with a low capacity ‘to develop and 
implement policies in order to provide collective goods such as security, order, and welfare to 
its citizens in a legitimate and effective manner untrammeled by internal or external actors’ 
(Paul 2010, 5), and without control over its whole territory (Kassab 2015). Particularly since the 
2006 war between Hizbullah and Israel, mainstream IR literature has focused on the erosion of 
Lebanon’s internal sovereignty by illegitimate non-state actors, particularly Hizbullah (see e.g. 
Gal-Or 2008; Pan 2006; Shalom 2009). Unsurprisingly, such approaches see sovereignty as an 
achievable condition of absolute state authority over a territory, and where this is lacking it 
must be strengthened. 
The idea of strengthening Lebanon’s sovereignty has been at the basis of international policy 
towards Lebanon in the twenty-first century. UN Security Council resolution 1559 (2004), for 
example, is an emblematic attempt to reinstate state sovereignty by calling for ‘the disbanding 
and disarmament of all Lebanese and non- Lebanese militias; … [and] the extension of the 
control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory’. Between 2006 and 2007, 
the USA gave substantial military aid to Lebanon in order to strengthen state sovereignty over 
Hizbullah controlled areas, and to aid in the 2007 battle to control Nahr el-Bared refugee camp 
(see Ramadan 2009b). More recently, the UK’s ‘Backing stability’ programme has sought to 
protect Lebanon’s territorial integrity through teichopolitical measures like walls, watchtowers 
and other barriers (Rosière and Jones 2012) aimed at hardening the border with Syria against a 
spillover of conflict from there, especially in the form of ISIS militants. These interventions are 
typical of recent international approaches to sovereignty and the preservation of international 
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order, which have sought to strengthen and preserve the territorial integrity of states, like 
Lebanon, deemed fragile and at risk of failure. 
However, a narrative of Lebanon as a weak state has been present since the era of the French 
colonial mandate. After independence in 1943, Lebanon’s consociational democracy has often 
been described as resting on a fragile balance of power between its religious communities. One 
of the main intellectuals of Lebanese nationalism, Michel Chiha, described the compromise of 
power between religious communities, as a ‘necessary’ flaw needed to keep the country’s 
religious and political diversity under control and avoid deeper divisions (Salam 2001). Similar 
metaphors of weakness were elaborated amidst independent Lebanon’s economic 
development in the 1950s and 1960s (Fregonese 2012b). Historically, the Lebanese state has 
not had full control of its whole territory, nor a monopoly of legitimate violence. Social and 
political allegiances often follow lines of family and confessional connections, while the 
presence of irregular and semi-regular armed groups have often been tolerated by the state 
(Khalaf 2002; Salibi 2003; Hanf 2015).  
Today, the largest and most important of these groups is Hizbullah, which is both a political 
party and an armed movement. Hizbullah is ‘simultaneously part of the state, nonstate, and 
state-like’ (Fregonese 2012b, 668), controlling large areas of South Beirut, South Lebanon and 
the Bekaa Valley, where it has provided infrastructural and social services since the end of the 
civil war and especially after Israel’s 2006 military campaign in south Lebanon (Flanigan and 
Abdel-Samad 2009; Wiegand 2009; Heger and Jung 2015). To confront Hizbullah, and extend 
control over these territories, is beyond the capabilities of the Lebanese state, and previous 
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attempts to do so have resulted in violent conflict (Fregonese 2012b). Instead, the state has 
largely tolerated Hizbullah’s role as a self-declared Islamic resistance movement, as it has 
historically tolerated other groups who practice political violence and control territory within 
Lebanon’s borders. Such sovereign anomalies are the products of complex interactions 
between state actors and non-state groups that have developed specific spaces and practices 
throughout modern Lebanon’s political history. These interactions, and the hybrid political 
formations that can result, make any binary opposition between state and non-state, legitimate 
and irregular violence, limiting for understanding sovereignty in Lebanon (Fregonese 2012b). 
Sovereignty is defined as the nation-state’s monopoly over ‘the legitimate use of violence 
within its territory’ (Biersteker and Weber 1996b, 14) and the protection of the population 
within that territory against outside threats (Agnew 2009). This perfect hypothetical notion of 
sovereignty is the measure against which Lebanon is deemed to fall short as a ‘weak’ state. 
However, sovereignty as a constructed process resulting from ‘knowledgeable practices by 
human agents, including citizens, non-citizens, theorists, and diplomats’ (Biersteker and Weber 
1996b, 18), and the many disconnections between de jure and de facto sovereignty (Sidaway 
2003; McConnell 2009; Mavroudi 2010), have long been debated in political sciences 
(Biersteker and Weber 1996a; Clapham 1998; Krasner 1999) and political geography (Agnew 
2009; McConnell 2010; Mountz 2013). Despite these critiques, many contributions in political 
science still assume a ‘totalizing concept of sovereignty […] as the sole, basic and universal term 
for describing political power and community’ (Jennings 2011, 25), conceiving sovereignty as ‘a 
necessary feature of political life: the very possibility of political action, political order, and 
political protection seems to depend upon it’ (Brown 2010, 54). Similarly, a ‘silent statism’ (Ince 
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and Barrera de la Torre 2016, 10) remains engrained in much political geography. While 
political geographers have recognised the multiplicity of actors negotiating sovereignty and 
territoriality alongside the state, particularly in postcolonial settings where ‘the enduring binary 
logic’ of strong western versus weak postcolonial states must be transcended (Sidaway 2003, 
174), few contributions have effectively complicated the distinction between state and non-
state domains. Building on geographical notions of hybridity as a mixing and transgression of 
ontological binaries (Whatmore 2006), the ‘hybrid sovereignty’ (Fregonese 2012b) perspective 
challenges the very discreteness of these categories, and the ethical and political bases of this 
distinction, by focusing on the overlaps, the cross-contaminations and collaborations between 
them. In so doing, it calls into question those discursive ‘structures of legitimacy’ (Gregory 
2006, 100) that confine non-state actors to an ethico-political realm with which state politics 
should not (officially) engage. This approach is essential for understanding the political 
geographies of Lebanon (Hourani 2013; Nagel and Staeheli 2015; Stel 2015). 
In the case of Palestinian camps in Lebanon, the hybrid sovereignty approach casts new light on 
questions of security, territorial control and sovereignty, between humanitarian institutions, 
state agencies and Palestinian political and militant actors. In such a situation of multifarious 
territorialities, contested sovereignty and periodical dysfunctionality of the government, a 
straightforward reading of the camps as spaces of exception is overly simplistic. As Ramadan 
(2009b, 157) argues ‘the case of Lebanon must stretch to breaking point these ideas of a 
deliberate suspension of the rule of law by the sovereign, when the Lebanese state is unable to 
exercise sovereignty over large portions of its own territory’. In seeing sovereignty as hybrid, 
we break out of a dualistic framing of sovereignty as either monopolized by the state or lacking. 
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Instead, we can see the suspension of the law in the space of exception as a hybrid act, taken by 
and between state and other actors. This analysis is open to the political potential of camps – 
not spaces of exception outside of politics, but hybrid spaces of political possibility where the 
political acts and practices of the camps have mingled with and impacted on Lebanon’s state 
sovereignty in important ways. 
Recasting exception through hybridity: genealogies of sovereignty in the Palestinian 
refugee camps  
Exile has been a difficult experience for Palestinian refugees and for Lebanon itself. With its 
diverse population of 18 recognized religious groups, bound together by a confessional political 
system that divides power along confessional lines, Lebanon was ill prepared for the influx of 
mostly Sunni Muslim Palestinians in 1948. Today, Lebanon is host to around 455,000 Palestinian 
refugees registered with UNRWA. These are the survivors and descendants of the 100,000 
Palestinians who crossed into Lebanon in 1948. In total, around three-quarters of a million 
Palestinians became refugees in that first Arab-Israel war. Many of the Palestinian urban upper 
and middle classes settled in Lebanese cities, especially in Beirut’s newer neighborhoods like 
Ras Beirut, and Tariq Jdid in the south of the city. Most Christian Palestinians were granted 
Lebanese citizenship and settled in more traditionally Christian areas of Beirut like Ayn al 
Rummana and Furn al Shebbak (Husseini 1994). However, the large majority of refugees were 
Muslims from rural northern Palestine, who settled in sixteen refugee camps (four were 
destroyed in conflict in the 1970s) across the country, mostly clustered around the edges of 
Beirut, the northern city of Tripoli, and the southern cities of Sidon and Tyre. 
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Marginalizing Palestinian refugees in camps, and resisting all forms of integration and 
normalization, has been the state’s response to this challenge. The Lebanese government has 
consistently sought to maintain the transience of the Palestinian presence through intense 
restrictions on construction in the camps, on Palestinian access to the labor markets, property 
rights, and relief, education and social services. Abandoned by the state, responsibility for 
Palestinian refugees instead falls to UNRWA.1 UNRWA has many state-like functions, including 
registering births and deaths, and in Lebanon alone it currently operates 69 schools, 27 clinics 
and provides relief to over 61,000 special hardship cases. Transferring responsibility for 
refugees to a ‘surrogate state’ role performed by UN agencies is not unique to Lebanon, but 
widespread across the Middle East (Kagan 2011, 1; see also Takkenberg 1998). As Talhami 
(2003, 147) remarks, ‘UNRWA has been placed in charge of keeping alive the bulk of the 
dismembered Palestinian nation as if it were a quasi-state, or a state within a state’. Such 
humanitarian ‘assistance has been presented to Palestinians as a substitute for their rights’ 
(Weighill 1997, 294–5). 
The twelve official Palestinian refugee camps are among many spaces in which the Lebanese 
state lacks sovereignty. While UNRWA’s mandate is strictly non-political, Palestinian camps 
have also long been attractive bases for militant groups, national liberation movements and 
their associated political organizations. These groups exercise power and governance in camps 
alongside UNRWA and seek to mobilize refugees to fight for their homeland. Since the Cairo 
Agreement of 1969, to be discussed in the next section, Lebanese police and security forces 
have conventionally not entered the camps to enforce the law. In the absence of a single 
Lebanese sovereign who suspends the rule of law, in Agamben’s terms, these multiple 
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Palestinian and international groups and institutions all participate in sovereign practices and 
contribute to the suspension of the normal legal order (Hanafi and Long 2010; Ramadan 2009b, 
2013). This situation has not emerged from nowhere, and in this section we outline the series 
of historical shifts that created the present situation: a genealogy of changing camp 
sovereignties. 
1948-1967: state control 
The first decade after displacement was one of abject Palestinian weakness, as peasants 
dispossessed and expelled from their land began to rebuild their lives in the camps. In Lebanon, 
this decade coincided with concerted intervention by the state into the administration and 
regulation of the Palestinian camps, alongside UNRWA. 1950 saw the creation of the Central 
Committee for Refugee Affairs which in 1959 became a Directorate within the Lebanese 
Ministry of Interior, working in close coordination with UNRWA (Roberts 2010, 78). It focused 
on aid, health, housing, personal status and education of the camp population, as well as 
regulating refugees’ mobility between camps, and negotiating with the owners of the land 
where camps had been set up. In 1950s Beirut, there were clear demarcations between the 
camps and the city,2 but over subsequent decades, camps like Burj al-Barajneh and Shatila were 
engulfed as the city grew (Martin 2015).  
Security and order in the camps involved close collaboration between camp leaders and the 
Lebanese state, but while this might seem like the work of a strong state imposing itself in the 
camps, this decade saw the state’s near or actual loss of control on security in the country at 
large. In 1952, the first major political crisis since independence resulted in a bloodless coup. In 
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1958, amidst high political and sectarian tensions, the country was plunged into an even 
greater crisis, this time with an armed uprising with international involvement.3 With Fouad 
Chehab elected as the new President at the end of the 1958 clashes, a new era of support for 
geopolitical neutrality – neither openly pro-Western nor pan-Arabist – inter-communal 
cooperation and social reforms began (El-Khazen 2000).  
As the second decade of Palestinian presence in Lebanon began, Chehab’s focus on neutrality 
and stability translated into increased political control by state authorities in the camps. The 
Deuxième Bureau, the Lebanese army intelligence section, was present in every camp, working 
alongside the Lebanese police, the Directorate of Refugee Affairs, and UNRWA-designated 
camp leaders. The Bureau sought to suppress all forms of Palestinian political activity and 
organization, vetting UNRWA employees and appointments, recruiting spies and informants in 
the camps, and intimidating, arresting, beating and even torturing activists in some cases 
(Sayigh 1977, 1994, 69–70). State repression extended further, materialized in the built 
environment of the camp and its shelters: ‘[r]oofs were not allowed, cement was prohibited 
material, cartographic boundaries were rigorously enforced’ (Abourahme 2015, 207).4 These 
state activities – ‘nearly a decade of intimidation and extortion’ (Sayigh 1994, 68) – produced 
deep resentment among the Palestinian population:  
Before 1970, when the PLO came to Lebanon, the Lebanese army was in the camps. If any 
person just threw water in the streets, the government would give you a fine. They don’t 
like Palestinian people. They were very hard on us before. 




[Palestinians suffered] complete humiliation by Lebanese governments and intelligence 
during the 1950s and 1960s. They were torturing Palestinians and considered us like Red 
Indians. This was one of the main reasons the Palestinian camps revolted, because we were 
completely humiliated and persecuted by the Lebanese government. I was a child and 
remember them arresting and torturing our fathers, especially the Lebanese intelligence.  
- Interview with Palestinian male, age 50, Nahr el-Bared camp, November 2007 
 
Palestinian political hopes in this period largely rested with the pan-Arab nationalism of 
Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and his followers. Nasserism sought to unite the Arab 
peoples, and liberate Palestine militarily. In Lebanon, the Nasserist-influenced Arab National 
Movement united Arab nationalists and intellectuals from Lebanese and Palestinian circles. But 
with the defeat of the Arab armies, led by Nasser, by Israel in the Six Day War of 1967, the focus 
of political organization and Palestinian political hopes began to change. A number of groups 
seeking a Palestinian armed revolution had emerged and grown in the late 1950s and 60s. In 
the aftermath of the Arab humiliation of 1967, a 1968 military raid against Israel by Palestinian 
fighters near the Jordanian village of al-Karama (meaning dignity) captured the imagination and 
provided the ‘foundation myth’ of the Palestinian commando movement (Khalidi 1997, 196). In 
February 1969, the largest of these groups – Fatah, headed by Yasser Arafat – emerged to lead 
the Palestine Liberation Organization, a diplomatic and political apparatus initially established 
by the Arab League. The focus of Palestinian political activities and hopes shifted from the Arab 
states to the emergent revolutionary armed struggle movement. In this, there was a 
generational shift too: the younger generation of Palestinians born in exile tended to be more 
radicalized and less willing to trust in the Arab states to resolve their situation. 
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1968-1970: Palestinian autonomy 
The years 1968-1970 saw the relationship between Lebanese hosts and Palestinian guests 
change entirely and irreversibly. The rise of Palestinian armed movements led to a fundamental 
change in the structure and organization of Palestinian camps across Lebanon, with the gradual 
loss of state authority inside the camps and the passage of decisional and organizational power 
to the PLO and affiliated organizations. Palestinian armed movements began operating in south 
Lebanon in 1968, launching raids across the border into Israel that resulted in escalating clashes 
with the Israeli army in the south. These clashes culminated in an Israeli military operation in 
December 1968 against Beirut International Airport, where commandos destroyed thirteen 
civilian aircraft belonging to the Lebanese national carrier Middle East Airlines. This attack was 
a warning to the Lebanese government to take control of the Palestinian movements on its 
territory, but within Lebanon sustained pressure grew on the government to allow Palestinian 
resistance movements to organize and operate on Lebanese territory. This pressure came from 
Palestinians in the camps, from Palestinian armed forces in the south, against whom the 
Lebanese army tried unsuccessfully to exert control in October 1969, and from parts of 
Lebanese society and the political scene sympathetic to the Palestinian cause – particularly the 
Arab national movements, students, Muslims and leftists.  
On 23 April 1969, a march organized by Lebanese progressive parties and Palestinian 
organizations, in solidarity with the Palestinian fighters in the south, was attended by as many 
as 12,000 people, and was suppressed violently by Lebanese security forces. According to El-
Khazen (2000, 142), this confrontation was instigated by Fatah, with the intention to provoke a 
crisis and bring the issue of Palestinian resistance into the open. There was clear coordination in 
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this between the Palestinian movements and several leftist Lebanese political parties and 
movements. El-Khazen (2000, 149-150) explains that Lebanese Sunni and Christian leaders 
diverged on the Palestinian question, with the former arguing for state coordination (tansiq) 
with Palestinian guerrillas, and the latter seeing coordination as a violation of Lebanese 
sovereignty. The ensuing deadlock and disagreement over the Palestinian question brought 
down the government of prime minister Rashid Karami, who had only held the position since 
his predecessor, Abdallah Yafi, resigned in the aftermath of the Israeli attack on Beirut airport 
four months earlier (Hanf 2015, 160–170). 
In the same period, further decisive actions took place in the camps themselves. Here, ordinary 
Palestinians confronted and refused to cooperate with Lebanese security forces and the hated 
Deuxième Bureau, and some took up arms to defend the camps alongside the armed groups. In 
his strikingly detailed personal narrative of everyday life as a refugee, Jamal Krayem Kanj (2010) 
reports a landmark event in the sovereignty relationship between the camps and the state. On 
28 August 1969, a police enquiry into illegal construction in Nahr el-Bared camp in northern 
Lebanon uncovered a conscription office for Fatah’s armed wing Al-Asifah, and resulted in the 
arrest and interrogation of a Palestinian militant, Abu Atif. Widespread protest spread across 
the camp and quickly escalated into clashes between police and camp residents, who stormed 
the police station as police evacuated. Kanj writes: ‘I was ecstatic to be inside the same 
structure that used to instill fear in me just by looking at it or even passing it by on the road. 
The building was the center of intimidation, humiliation and horror in the camp’ (2010, 67-68). 
The main road connecting Northern Lebanon to Syria was cut off by protesters, who overturned 
and set fire to an army truck. When the army attempted to enter the camp by force, they were 
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quickly pushed back by residents armed with weapons seized from the police station, and a 
ceasefire was declared in the evening. In negotiations that followed, the Lebanese army agreed 
to withdraw from the camp. News of events spread quickly, and by the end of September, all 
the camps had contested and expelled the police and Deuxième Bureau offices and forces, and 
in their place the PLO deployed its own armed security force, Al-Kifah al-Musallah al-Filastini 
(the Palestinian Armed Struggle) These events are remembered as the intifada of the camps – 
an uprising against oppression by Lebanese state security. They were also, most importantly, 
the trigger for a fundamental rearrangement of sovereignty and of the relation of exception 
between the camp and the state.  
Until today, there remains deep resentment in the camps about that period of Lebanese rule 
brought to an end in 1969. This uprising is explained directly by the unjust oppression 
Palestinians suffered under Lebanese rule. Another interviewee described: 
‘[the] very severe and racial … discrimination, racial treatment and abuses that the 
Deuxième Bureau practiced inside the camps. ... Palestinians couldn’t visit another camp 
without a permission from the Security, the Lebanese Security. ... Two or three Palestinians 
couldn’t meet and talk together inside the camp – ‘what are you talking about?’ So the 
result of this very inhumane treatment led to what Palestinians called the intifada of the 
camps.  
- Interview with Palestinian male, age 38, Sidon, December 2007 
 
As this political crisis grew, so did pressure from the Arab states for Lebanon to allow 
Palestinian fighters to operate freely in Lebanese territory. These pressures led to the Cairo 
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Agreement, secretly brokered by Egypt’s President Nasser and signed by Emile Bustani, head of 
the Lebanese army, and Yasser Arafat, head of the PLO, in November 1969. The Cairo 
Agreement was the key moment in the renegotiation of the relationship between the camps 
and the Lebanese state. It gave Palestinians freedom to move, reside and work across Lebanon, 
legitimized and regulated the presence and activities of Palestinian guerrilla movements in 
Lebanon, and formalized the autonomy of the camps under the rule of the PLO and Al-Kifah al-
Musallah. The agreement emphasized that the autonomous Palestinian presence was to 
operate ‘in cooperation with the local Lebanese authorities’ (section 1.2) and ‘in accordance 
with the principles of the sovereignty and security of Lebanon’ (section 1.4). The agreement 
reaffirmed the Lebanese authorities ‘shall continue to exercise all their prerogatives and 
responsibilities in all areas of Lebanon in all circumstances’ (section 2.13). But the agreement 
included no mechanisms of enforcement, and in legitimizing Palestinian control of the camps, 
de facto sovereignty was sacrificed by the state and gained by the PLO (El-Khazen 2000, 162). 
The provision for PLO representatives to be based at Lebanese army headquarters, in order to 
resolve disputes (section 2.7), further highlights the contamination of state by non-state 
domains, and the hybrid nature of sovereign control. 
The camps therefore became – in an official way – part of a parallel Palestinian political order. 
This hybrid formula of Palestinian autonomy under Lebanese sovereignty contained the camps 
within the order of Lebanese sovereignty through their exception from that order. The Cairo 
Agreement represents a declaration of a state of exception, excepting (in the sense of taking 
outside, ex-capere) the camps and the Palestinian movements from the normal order and law. 
The agreement formalized the suspension of law in the camps through the de facto recognition 
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of the PLO as a sovereign actor who, in turn, claimed to recognize overall Lebanese sovereignty 
(but in practice rarely did). Sovereignty was therefore turned in on itself, fractured and 
hybridized. This agreement between a (sovereign?) state and the supposedly bare lives of 
stateless refugees demonstrates the limits of any formulaic reading of the camps as spaces of 
exception. The exception existed, but its formulation, declaration and reproduction were hybrid 
acts. Such an agreement was unprecedented: 
‘In no country other than Lebanon, and in no regional order other than that of the Arab 
state system, would an agreement that derives its legitimacy from writing off part of the 
country’s national sovereignty be possible. It was an agreement by which a country 
relinquished part of its prerogatives and delegated authority over part of its land to 
external parties engaged in war with another country to help diffuse an internal political 
crisis.’ (El-Khazen 2000, 161) 
1970-1982: Palestinian Revolution and the collapse of the state  
The era of the Palestinian Revolution was an intense and fraught one, where growing 
Palestinian militant activity ‘exacerbated the contradictions of the Lebanese system’ (Brynen 
1989, 50), made Lebanon increasingly unstable, and blurred the boundaries of sovereignty and 
security between the camps and the outside. In September 1970, civil war erupted in Jordan 
between the state and Palestinian guerrilla movements, due to precisely the same tensions 
between the former’s demand for sovereignty and the latter’s demand for autonomy in fighting 
Israel. The PLO leadership and guerrillas were defeated and expelled. Turki (1988, 132) 
describes how, in winter 1971, remnants of Palestinian forces from Jordan began to arrive and 
regroup ‘in the most barren areas in the south [of Lebanon], by Mt. Hermon, as well as in the 
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Bekaa Valley to the east’. Despite obviously coordinated attacks between the Lebanese and 
Israeli Armies against these guerrillas (Ibid.), Lebanon soon became the hub and headquarters 
of the PLO and the Palestinian Resistance Movement. This era of the Revolution in Lebanon 
lasted until 1982, and saw the reorganization of Palestinian society, and a cultural and political 
renaissance. It was during these years that the PLO was granted observer status at the United 
Nations, and Arafat addressed the General Assembly. This was a moment of renewed pride and 
optimism, as Palestinian refugees became active resistors and national liberation fighters 
instead of passive victims, and took control of their own lives for the first time: 
The Cairo Agreement was firstly to facilitate the military work of the fedayeen 
[revolutionary fighters] in the south, and secondly to manage our own local authorities in 
the camps. We became responsible for our own discipline and security in the camps … At 
first it was good because it was organized by a military constitution, the Kifah al-Musallah – 
armed struggle. Its headquarters were in Beirut and it was one of the PLO institutions. After 
1969, the PLO made many institutions: the Red Crescent, refugee responsibles [sic], 
education responsibles. They tried to organize into departments and ministries, as a 
government. As for security, they could arrest, accuse and imprison anyone. It was good at 
first, the problems were less and things worked well with the Popular Committees. 
- Interview with Palestinian male, age 76, Nahr el-Bared camp, November 2007. 
 
The PLO was able to build up a huge power base in Lebanon, controlling the camps officially, 
and well beyond the boundaries of the camps unofficially. The southeastern Arkoub district, 
where guerrilla activities were focused, became known as ‘Fatah Land’ (Khalaf 2002, 217), and 
the PLO functioned effectively as a ‘state-within-a-state’ (Sayigh 1997, 21). This ‘mini-state’ 
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employed as many as 65% of the Palestinian workforce, and offered free medical services, 
education subsidies and camp infrastructure (Sayigh 1994, 213). Palestinian movements 
cultivated alliances with Lebanese parties within and outside government, which gave the latter 
access to both financial patronage and arms supplies from the PLO and their sponsors (Hanf 
2015, 169). Armed raids by Palestinian groups against Israel resulted in repeated Israeli military 
interventions in Lebanon, and Lebanese civilians in the south – many of whom had supported 
and joined the Palestinian movements initially – were increasingly caught in the crossfire. 
Attempts by the Lebanese army to rein in Palestinian groups resulted in further clashes in 1973. 
In one such episode in April 1973, Lebanese National Movement militias fought alongside 
Palestinians against the army, which was bombarding the camps around Beirut (Turki 1988, 
133). Even the Lebanese army became divided, with commander Ahmad Khatib threatening to 
shoot soldiers if they fired at Palestinians; Khatib and his troops later did split from the army 
command in the first year of the civil war (Ibid.). Christian groups like the Lebanese Kata’ib 
(Phalanges) recruited and armed their own irregular militia forces, with some collaboration 
from army officers. Through these events, there was further hybridization between non-state 
and state actors, with the Palestinian question further polarizing and dividing Lebanon.  
While much of the Palestinian leadership was based in Beirut, it was events in the southern city 
of Sidon that accelerated Lebanon’s descent into civil war. In February 1975, a dispute over 
fishing rights with former president Camille Chamoun resulted in the assassination of Marouf 
Saad, the city’s Nasserist former mayor and one of its most influential politicians. Saad had long 
been close to the Palestinian refugee community in Sidon’s two refugee camps, but had been 
involved in a long struggle with Palestinian movements for control of local politics. The 
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Palestinian militias Saiqa and Fatah opened offices in the city, outside the Palestinian camps, 
and after clashing with Saad’s Tanzīm al Quwwah al Sha‛biiya fī Sayda (Organization of the 
Popular Force in Sidon), the Palestinians briefly kidnapped Saad in 1970. But after Saad’s 
shooting in 1975, Palestinian forces and Saad supporters together shut down the city by 
blocking the coastal road and setting up checkpoints, and clashes with Lebanese security forces 
went on for four days (see El-Khazen 2000, 268). Through this episode, the domains of state 
and non-state were thoroughly blurred. The Palestinian camps were the locus of militant 
activity that became bound up with Lebanese urban politics, the non-state Palestinian groups at 
times clashing then allying with the hybrid private militia of a Lebanese politician, who together 
clashed with the state army and asserted territorial control over the city. 
Just weeks later, in April 1975, the civil war began and drew in the Palestinian armed forces on 
the side of their allies in the Lebanese National Movement. The civil war saw further 
hybridizations between state and non-state actors, with elements of the government, army and 
armed militias contesting and at times collaborating to control territory and infrastructure. The 
various Palestinian armed groups were participants in this, fighting against and alongside 
different Lebanese movements at different times, as well as continuing armed actions against 
Israel. In the first two years of the war, Kata’ib and allied militias besieged and destroyed the 
Palestinian camps in East Beirut – Karantina, Dikwaneh, Jisr el-Basha and Tel al-Zaatar – 
resulting in several thousand dead and renewed displacement for those who survived (Yassin 
2010). In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon, occupied Beirut and put the PLO under siege. With the 
negotiated evacuation of the PLO leadership and fighters from Beirut, under international 
supervision, the era of the Palestinian Revolution was over. 
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After 1982: from autonomy to ambiguity 
From this point, the Palestinian gains of the late 1960s and early 1970s were reversed. One of 
the first acts of the post-Revolution era, after the surrender of the PLO leaders in 1982, was the 
massacre of Palestinian civilians in Sabra and Shatila camps by Lebanese Christian militia, allied 
to Israel and in an area under overall Israeli military control (Fisk 2001, 359–400). The PLO 
structures and forces that had controlled and protected the camps were gone, and Palestinians 
became reliant again on UNRWA rations (Sayigh 1994, 213). With Syrian influence in Lebanon 
growing through the mid-1980s, camps remaining loyal to the PLO in Beirut and the south were 
put under renewed siege by the Syrian-backed Lebanese Shi’a militia Amal (see Sayigh 1994), 
while Syrian-backed Palestinian factions took control of the camps in the north:5  
From 1984, there was no Kifah al-Musallah. Other organizations drove out Fatah from the 
camp, and the new organizations were allied with Syria, which made the Popular 
Committee very weak. Above all was Syrian intelligence, and their resources were all from 
Syria. Anyone making problems were arrested by Syrian forces in Lebanon or sent to 
Damascus, to the dim and dark prisons of Damascus. After 1984 until 2000, there was no 
security committee, no kind of disciplinary structure or problem solving except the Popular 
Committee, and they were very weak. The situation was very anxious, the government 
could arrest people leaving the camp. Syrians, Lebanese, they all tried to terrify us. 
- Interview with Palestinian male, age 76, Nahr el-Bared camp, November 2007. 
 
In 1987, the wartime Lebanese government officially abrogated the Cairo Agreement, ending 
official recognition of the PLO presence and role in managing the camps. Since the end of the 
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civil war in 1990-1, the Palestinian camps have faced decades of marginalization, insecurity and 
at times instability.  
Today, the legacies of the era of the Palestinian Revolution are many, and the current status of 
the camps is still shaped by that period. While armed struggle against Israel is no longer active 
in Lebanon, the camps are still filled with symbols of the Revolution, and slogans promoting 
struggle, resistance and solidarity with the Palestinian national movement (Ramadan 2009a). 
While the Cairo Agreement is no longer in force, Lebanese military and police still do not enter 
the camps to enforce Lebanese sovereignty and rule of law. What has changed is that neither 
the PLO nor anyone else is recognized as responsible for the camps. The camps are simply 
treated as ‘extraterritorial’ spaces– outside the state’s sphere of control and responsibility, 
present absences: 
We have the expression ‘security islands’. This expresses the functional rule of the 
Palestinian camps this country agreed to in the Cairo Agreement. The Palestinian 
organizations are the authority inside the camps. But the Lebanese government withdrew 
from this agreement, but still accepted camps as security islands. Now [there is] no 
representation, the government doesn’t consider any Palestinian organizations as 
representatives and responsible. After withdrawing from the Cairo Agreement, the camps 
were considered ‘extra territory’: they don’t recognize anyone inside as responsible. […] I 
believe Lebanon needed this, so that the state wouldn’t be responsible for the camps, their 
welfare and security, and they don’t recognize others as responsible. 




This ambiguity is central to the governance structures of the camps today. The Cairo Agreement 
no longer applies, but de facto the camps remain autonomous – surrounded by Lebanese 
control but abandoned within. Several of the camps have Lebanese army checkpoints at their 
entrances, where people and goods going in and out are monitored. Entering Rashidieh camp, 
in the far south of Lebanon, illustrates this shift in sovereign control:  
Turning off the main road between Tyre and Naqoura to enter Rashidieh camp, we cross a 
border. First, our car is stopped by Lebanese soldiers. They check our identity documents; 
we are foreigners so they check our names against a list of foreigners with permission to 
enter. They check inside the car, they check the back, and then we are waved through. Our 
car trundles 100 meters along a potholed concrete no man’s land. We pass between 
Palestinian flags, faces of dead Palestinian fighters, ‘martyrs’ of Fatah, and under an 
archway bearing nationalist slogans and a photograph of Yasser Arafat. We stop by a small 
concrete building; a man in military fatigues carrying a Kalashnikov checks our papers again, 
asks who we are and why we are there. We are waved through, past more flags, boards and 
posters for Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, the PLF, the PFLP, UNRWA, the DFLP, then 
Fatah, and into the camp. 
- Research diary, July 2003. 
 
In the absence of state control, power and governance inside the camps are exercised by a 
combination of Palestinian and international institutions. UNRWA administers the camps and 
the refugee population, providing services and relief, a ‘phantom sovereign’ (Hanafi 2008, 91) 
without political mandate; Palestinian political factions, form political and popular committees, 
and provide security and policing; Islamist groups, religious leaders and local and international 
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NGOs all also exercise power within the camps. These groups overlap, compete and often 
conflict, but together control the camps and those living within them:  
UNRWA has no authority over people in the camps. Authority is for the local authorities: 
first the Popular Committee, and second, [senior] faction leaders in the area. But the main 
local authority is the Popular Committees. Since the civil war in Lebanon, there have been 
no police stations in the camps – the [Lebanese authorities] deal just with the Popular 
Committees in the camps. UNRWA’s responsibility is to give services and give help to 
people safely and justly, but if there are security problems they do not interfere. 
- Interview with Palestinian male, retired UNRWA employee, age 76, Badawi camp, 
November 2007 
 
Today, the camps are spaces not of one sovereign who can suspend the rule of law, in 
Agamben’s terms, but of multiple partially sovereign actors who all contribute to the 
suspension of the laws and the state of exception (Hanafi and Long 2010; Ramadan 2009b, 
2013). Crucially, this suspension of law does not equate to total lawlessness. Despite no longer 
recognizing any alternative authority in the camps, the Lebanese authorities continue to talk 
formally with PLO and UNRWA representatives in Lebanon, and informally with camp popular 
committees. Suleiman (1999) argues that Lebanese law is enforced through such coordination 
with Palestinian groups (see Abou-Zaki 2013). But this is precisely the point: the law is enforced 
not by the state but through a hybrid arrangement between the Lebanese authorities and 
Palestinian (non-)authorities. This is the nature of the state of exception in the camps today. 
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Palestinians’ bitter experiences during the civil war make many reluctant for this situation to 
change. Four camps were completely destroyed and depopulated during the war, while others 
were put under military siege for years at a time. Most recently, in 2007, Nahr el-Bared camp 
was destroyed in a four month conflict (see Ramadan 2009b, 2010): 
‘The camps are vulnerable, you know. [In] the period of 30 years, so many camps have been 
destroyed and some of them were also destroyed under the eyes of the army and the 
government, and nobody has moved to protect the Palestinians. And the Sabra and Shatila 
massacres took place under international – not only local – international eyes and 
international presence. This doesn’t mean if you have arms or a kind of authority inside the 
camp, that it has to be against the Lebanese or it has to lessen Lebanese sovereignty. This 
kind of autonomy shouldn’t contradict or oppose Lebanese sovereignty and authority.’ 
- Interview with Palestinian male, age 38, Sidon, December 2007 
 
This claim that Palestinian autonomy should not deny Lebanese sovereignty is the contradiction 
at the heart of the sovereign arrangements over the camps. Palestinian autonomy, framed by 
the Cairo Agreement that is no more, inevitably challenges and undermines any conventional 
notion of state sovereignty. Just as in the years of the Revolution and the Cairo Agreement, it 
cannot be any other way. Whether it is the recognized, formalized rule of the PLO in the camps 
or today’s reality of a security vacuum, the state does not enforce its rule in the camps. That is 
an ongoing legacy of the uprising of the camps in 1969, and the rise and fall of Palestinian 




Today, Lebanon is at the heart of a new refugee crisis. Of the 4.8 million refugees to date (17 
August 2016) who have fled the war in Syria since 2011, at least 1.1 million (and probably far 
more) have sought refuge in Lebanon. Together, Syrian and Palestinian refugees number the 
equivalent of one third of Lebanon’s own population. The Lebanese government has refused to 
set up camps for Syrians, and relations between Lebanese communities and Syrian refugees 
have frequently been characterized by tensions and hostility. This Lebanese response to the 
current Syrian refugee crisis has been profoundly shaped by its experiences of the Palestinian 
one: the Palestinian refugees were never able to return and, over decades, their camps became 
sources of insecurity and instability for Lebanon. 
The Palestinian refugee camps of Lebanon have been crucial arenas in which Lebanese state 
sovereignty has been asserted, contested, contaminated, shared and lost. In this article, we 
have traced the shifting arrangements of sovereignty over the camps, from the state control of 
the 1950s, through the state repression of the 1960s, the uprising of the camps in 1969 led by 
Palestinian militant groups that resulted in the Cairo Agreement, the years of the Palestinian 
Revolution between 1970 and 1982, and the state abandonment since the abrogation of the 
Cairo Agreement in 1987 and the end of the civil war in 1990. Throughout these different eras, 
the state of exception has been characterized not by a binary opposition between bare life and 
the sovereign, but rather by hybrid arrangements of sovereignty between the state, 
international humanitarian organizations, and Palestinian political and militant groups. Even as 
these relations of power and governance have changed from one era to the next, hybridity has 
prevailed throughout. There is no single sovereign: not the state, nor UNRWA, nor the PLO. 
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Control of the camps and those refugees who dwell within their boundaries has always involved 
combinations and collaborations of control. While the camps are characterized by particular 
arrangements of control, this hybridity is in keeping with the nature of sovereignty in Lebanon 
more widely, where the state does not fully control its own territory, and rules through 
calculated collaboration with, and tolerance of, non-state and quasi-state actors. Through 
interactions and alliances with Lebanese parties, Palestinian leaders and militias were part of 
Lebanon’s hybrid sovereignties beyond the camps too – evident in the April 1969 events that 
brought down the Karami premiership, the April 1973 clashes that divided the army, and the 
March 1975 shut down of Sidon, all discussed above. 
For decades, the camps have been active arenas of political organization and struggle through 
which Palestinians have resisted their marginalization and their exile, both in military and more 
mundane ways. The first decade of abject Palestinian weakness, the second decade of political 
oppression by state authorities, the uprising of 1969 that secured Palestinian autonomy, and 
the armed Revolution for national liberation that was anchored in refugee camps across the 
country, but transcended their boundaries. The era of the Palestinian Revolution was one of 
political organization, cultural renaissance and militant activity. The peasants became 
revolutionaries, as Rosemary Sayigh (2007) memorably put it. Through this time, Palestinian 
political agency was transformed, manifested and performed in myriad ways, not only through 
participation in armed struggle, but also the everyday acts that supported it: the cooking and 
cleaning, bringing up children, maintaining traditions, telling stories and singing songs that 
reproduced a Palestinian people in exile who demanded the right to return to their homeland 
(Ramadan 2013). But while Palestinian movements gained great power in Lebanon, and in so 
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doing widened a great schism in Lebanese politics through the late 1960s and the 1970s, they 
did not succeed in liberating their homeland. The Palestinian Revolution, that era of Palestinian 
political empowerment between 1970 and 1982, ended in violence and defeat through the long 
civil war that tore their host state apart. 
Today, Palestinians in the camps are marginalized and impoverished, but they largely retain 
autonomy. The Cairo Agreement is no longer in force, yet its spirit remains. The camps are 
spaces not of intensified sovereign power but of sovereign abandonment, and the suspension 
of law is achieved not by the state but in its absence. This void is filled with an alternative 
Palestinian order that produces distinct values and subjectivities, contributes to the suspension 
of the law, controls its conditions, and shares in practices of sovereignty and governance. 
Through this partial sovereignty, in a state of multiple partial, hybrid and overlapping 
sovereignties, this Palestinian order still has the capacity to produce its own political life: 
something more than the depoliticized humanitarianism of international agencies, and 
something less than the citizenship of a state (Ramadan 2013). Yet the security of permanence, 
of home, remains elusive until today. Lacking a recognized state in a world of states, lacking 
secure status, title and representation, Palestinian life and presence are as contingent as their 
liminal politics – from Lebanon to Palestine itself. 
The Palestinian refugee camps of Lebanon today have been, to different degrees and at 
different stages, infrastructures for human survival managed by international humanitarian 
interventions, spaces of repressive state control, platforms for militant mobilization and armed 
struggle, and islands of insecurity abandoned by the state. None of these statuses has ever 
 34 
 
been absolute, and in attending to the hybrid nature of sovereignty, this article has cast light on 
the myriad political acts and spatial practices through which security, territorial control and 
sovereignty in the camps have been articulated, challenged and reworked. Rejecting a 
formulaic reading of the camps as spaces outside of politics, this article has traced a genealogy 
of the state of exception that reveals how shifting arrangements of sovereignty underpinned 





1. While the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) performs this humanitarian role for 
most refugees, Palestinians fall under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency (UNRWA). While this has meant a higher per capita spend for Palestinians than other 
refugees, the UNRWA regime is lacking in significant ways. UNHCR is mandated to offer 
international protection to refugees and seek durable solutions for refugee status, but these 
functions fall outside UNRWA’s mandate. Palestinian refugees therefore suffer a ‘protection 
gap’ (Akram 2002). 
2. Interview with Burj Al Barajneh popular committee, April 2002. 
3. From 1956, President Chamoun pursued pro-Western liberal capitalist policies that 
exacerbated inequalities, especially in Beirut’s Muslim majority areas. These inequalities 
‘became all the more acute as the regional conflict between Arab nationalism and Western 
foreign policy now began to infiltrate local politics’ (Kassir 2010, 453). Meanwhile, the US Cold 
War strategy of containment focused on Mediterranean states that they considered at risk of 
falling under Soviet or Nasserist influence. The events of 1958 led to US military intervention – 
the first application of the Eisenhower doctrine (Little 2001) – to quell the uprising and 
preventing socialist/Nasserist forces from tipping the power balance. 
4. Later, when the camps gained autonomy, this was again manifested in the building of more 
durable housing. Abourahme (2015, 208) cites Khoury (2006, 357): ‘From the tent to the 
concrete room roofed with canvas, to the corrugated iron roof, to the ‘roof of the revolution’ – 
 36 
 
she had to wait twenty years until ’68 to get a concrete roof. The concrete roof came with the 
revolution and the fedayeen.’ 
5. Syrian forces first intervened in the Lebanese civil war in 1976 to prevent the PLO from 
overthrowing the Lebanese state; Syrian forces remained in Lebanon until 2005. As well as 
having troops on the ground, Syria sponsored and supported various Palestinian and Lebanese 
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